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and an intense managerial complexity which undoubtedly reduces both the effectiveness 
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1. Introduction 
 
The European patent system was put in place in 1978, when eight European countries ratified 
the European Patent Convention (EPC).1 Under the EPC, the process of granting a patent was 
centralised and allocated to the EPO (European Patent Office). The EPC has since then 
continuously attracted new member states (there are 34 countries nowadays), witnessing the 
success of the system and a wide recognition of the usefulness of the services provided by the 
EPO. The EPC does not, however, provide a uniform system to enforce European patents 
once they are granted. A European patent only takes effect as a national patent in each state 
where it is validated and enforced after its grant by the EPO. In other words, once granted a 
patent is subject to the national rules and practices of the member states. In addition, several 
national patent offices within Europe continue to provide examination services for their own 
jurisdiction, independently from the EPO.2 
Such a fragmented system has two main implications for applicants. The first one is the 
well known prohibitive cost of patent protection in Europe. In contrast to other large regional 
or national patent offices in the world, payment of national validation and renewal fees, and 
the translation requirements must be multiplied by the number of countries where the 
applicant wants to have an effective protection. Despite the implementation of the London 
Agreement that aims at reducing translation requirements3 a European patent is still at least 
five times more expensive than in the United States (van Pottelsberghe and Mejer 2009). 
The second implication concerns post-grant enforcement mechanisms and is less 
frequently heard of. It is related to the high uncertainty and managerial complexity induced by 
variegated national approaches towards patent-related litigations and to the possibility of 
having opposite decisions (and hence outcome) in case of parallel litigations. Once the patent 
is validated in a patent office, the national jurisdiction has the competence to decide on patent 
litigation cases (infringement and validity cases) with effect on their own territory. Due to 
heterogeneous legal practices across countries, in case of multiple litigations there is a risk of 
observing courts reaching opposite conclusions. Such a decentralized enforcement system, 
where national jurisdictions have a supremacy over the patent issues, together with the lack of 
the common European market for the technology, where the patent rights are generally 
enforced in a few countries, generate a strong managerial complexity. 
The objective of this paper is to investigate the implications of the fragmented system for 
managing and enforcing patent rights in Europe. The description of litigation systems in four 
European countries, together with case studies, clearly expose the systemic incongruities that 
are induced by the European patent system in its current form Easier ‘parallel imports’, 
possible ‘time paradoxes’ and the de facto paradox of having EU-level competition policy and 
granting authority facing national jurisdictional primacy on patent issues make the 
management of intellectual property rights in Europe not only costly but also highly complex. 
The paper is structured as follows: the next section describes the litigation costs and 
institutional heterogeneity of judicial systems across four EPC contracting states and in the 
US. In section 3, three economic incongruities induced by the highly fragmented European 
patent system are described and illustrated through four case studies. Section 4 concludes. 
The results show that the prohibitive costs of  litigation in Europe together with ‘systemic 
incongruities’ induced by national primacy over patent issues induce a high level of 
uncertainty regarding the validity of a patent (and its market reach) and considerable 
managerial complexity. Such a system without doubt reduces the effectiveness and the 
attractiveness of the European patent system in terms of stimulating more innovation. The 
                                                 
1  Convention on the Grant of European Patents (EPC), done in Munich, 5 October 1973, revised version that 
entered into force on 13 December 2007. 
2  cf. van Pottelsberghe (2009) for recent data on this issue. 
3  Agreement on the Application of Article 65 EPC (London Agreement), done in London, 17 October 2000, OJ 
EPO 2001, 549. 
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clear solution to these incongruities would be to implement the Community patent jointly with 
a centralized jurisdiction mechanism. 
 
 
2. Uncertainty 
 
 
Enforcing patents in Europe is made complex by the number of institutions involved in the 
process and the possibility of having different outcomes across countries for a given patent. 
Patent validity can be challenged independently at both the European and national level. 
Within nine months following the decision to grant by the EPO, third parties can file an 
opposition to the grant before the EPO in order to revoke or amend a patent.4 What makes this 
procedure especially attractive for opponents is that the EPO decision on European patent 
validity is effective in all the states where the European patent is to be enforced. A decision of 
the EPO to revoke a European patent is supposedly final; the patent is cancelled in all the 
states where it was effectively validated.5 However, a decision to uphold a European patent 
(the decision to maintain the patent as granted or in an amended form) leaves the way open for 
further validity challenges before national courts that can pass judgement on the patent as of 
the validation date.6 The decision taken by the national court is binding only within the 
borders of the particular state where the litigation took place. As for infringement cases, the 
patent is subject to the respective laws of each individual state, having an effect on both legal 
certainty and managerial complexity; two issues that are tackled with and the following two 
subsections.7 
 
 
2.1. Litigation costs 
 
It is relatively affordable to file an opposition before the EPO, as the cost varies between 
€6000 and €50,000 (including patent lawyers’ fees).8 However, in case of multiple litigations 
in national jurisdictions, the costs must be cumulated over the number of countries where 
litigation is initiated. Currently, no official statistical data on patent litigation costs in the EPC 
contracting states is available. The main problem with collecting and simulating these costs 
comes from the high heterogeneity of legal practices across countries (to be discussed later in 
this section). So far, the most reliable information is probably the one published by the EPO 
(WPL/4/03) provides an estimation of a litigation’s costs (including court fees, fees for 
                                                 
4  According to Art. 138 of the EPC there are three possible grounds of opposition: the claimed invention is not 
patentable (either because the subject matter is excluded from patentability or because it lacks novelty or an 
inventive step); the specification of the patent does not reveal the invention sufficiently clearly and completely 
for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art; or the subject matter of the European patent extends beyond 
the content of the European application as originally filed. 
5  EPC, Article 105(b)(3) Limitation or revocation of the European patent. 
6  EPC, Article 137(2) Formal requirements for conversion. 
7  Until recently, companies tried to apply to patent cases the possibility of cross-border injunction granted under 
Article VI of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters (Brussels Convention). This provision allows a party to sue several defendants 
domiciled in different countries for a given proceeding. However, the European Court of Justice in Roche v. 
Rimus (C-539/03) and GAT v Luk (C-4/03) ruled that national courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent law, 
thus closing the way for cross-border injunctions. 
8  Mewburn Ellis LPP suggests that the cost of an opposition procedure at the EPO ranges between €6000 and 
€50000. This estimate is based on a case involving up to two rounds of correspondence between the parties 
during the opposition procedure and preparing for and taking oral proceedings. Similar costs are likely to be 
incurred for an appeal (www.mewburn.com/Patents/European_Patents/European__Patents:_Oppositions.htm, 
September 1st, 2008).   Similar cost approximation are provided by Harhoff (2006) who estimates that the cost of 
opposition ranges between € 15,000 and €25,0000 for each party. 
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hearing the witnesses as well as patent attorney’s cost) in the four EPC contracting states 
(Germany, France, the Netherlands and United Kingdom) where 90% of patent litigations in 
Europe currently take place. Table 1 presents the estimates along with US litigation costs.  
The costs are estimated for small market value patents (ie with an amount in dispute of less 
than €1 million). The cost of litigation would however increase with the amount at stake and 
with the complexity of the case. For example, in Germany the total litigation costs can be as 
high as €2 million with €10 million at stake (IP Campenhausen, 2004), whereas in the US the 
litigation costs may reach about €2,5 million if the amount at stake is higher than €16 million 
(Bessen and Meurer, 2006).9  
 
 
Table 1: Patent litigation costs and litigation activity in four EPC contracting states and 
US (in €1000) 
 Germany France 
The 
Netherlands 
United 
Kingdom 
Cumulative  
4 EPC 
United 
States 
L i t i g a t i o n  c o s t 1  
1st Instance 50 to 250 50 to 200 60 to 200 150 to 1,500 310 to 2,150 n.a. 
2nd Instance 90 to 190 40 to 150 40 to 150 150 to 1,000 320 to 1,490 n.a. 
Total 140 to 440 90 to 350 100 to 350 300 to 2,500 630 to 3,640 420 
L i t i g a t i o n  a c t i v i t y 2 
 # of patents 
in force 412,000 389,000 141,000 319,000 - 1,650,000 
 # of patents 
litigated 
200 (nullity) 
500 (infringement) 
300 70 85 - 3,075 
 (1) Estimations apply to a patent with an amount in dispute equivalent to about €1 million. For Germany 
numbers are given for both validity and infringement case. Cf. Table A.4 in the Appendix. Litigation cost is 
adapted from EPO Doc. WPL/11/05 Rev. 1, 16 February 2006 and AIPLA (2005), Bessen and Meurer (2006). 
(2) Total number of patents in force is adapted from WIPO Patent Report (2007 Edition) pp. 43 
http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/patent_report_2007.html and from data directly provided 
by national patent offices. Number of patents litigated adapted from EPO WPL/4/03, Gesamtstatistik über die 
Tätigkeit des Bundespatentgerichts (2004) and Bessen and Meurer (2008) for the US. 
 
Litigation costs vary significantly across jurisdictions. The United Kingdom is by far the 
most expensive jurisdiction among EPC member states. The cost is much higher than in the 
three other jurisdictions, and is nearly as high as their cumulated costs. The litigation costs in 
Germany, France and the Netherlands are similar. However, in case of multiple litigations, 
costs have to be cumulated across jurisdictions: they vary from €310,000 before the four 
tribunals of first instance up to €3.6 million when accounting for the cost of appeal at second 
instance. These costs are particularly prohibitive for individuals and small and medium firms 
and may affect the direction of their research activities as pointed by Lerner (1995). Compared 
with the United States the cost of multiple litigations in Europe is at least double. 
Table 1 also presents the number of patents in force and the number of cases of litigation in 
the four European jurisdictions and in the US. The US system, which covers a market of 300 
million inhabitants, has four to six times more patents in force than the largest European 
economies, which are individually at least three times smaller. The countries with the highest 
number of patents enforced logically have a large proportion of litigations. However, the share 
of litigations in the total number of patents varies substantially across countries. Germany is 
the country with the cheapest and most renowned judicial system for patent-related litigations 
within Europe. Figure 4 displays the position of the five countries along two dimensions: the 
                                                 
9  In extreme cases, the lawyers cost can be as high as tens of millions of US dollars. For example, in Bristol 
Myers Squibb v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, the accused infringer, Bristol Myers, was awarded over US$25 million in 
legal fees from Rhone-Poulenc Rorer. 
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average cost of litigation per thousand capita on the horizontal axis and the share of litigation 
in the total number of patents enforced in the country on the vertical axis. A traditional non-
linear demand curve seems to drive the relationship, with at one extreme Germany (with 
relatively low costs but many litigations) and at the other extreme the United Kingdom with 
much fewer - but expensive - litigations. For litigations with higher value at stake the curve 
would mainly shift towards the right-hand side. 
 
Figure 4: A litigation demand curve – small market value patents, 2004 
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(*) For the EPO, instead of the total number of patents in force, the total number of EPO granted patents in 2004 
was taken as the denominator. It is assumed that on average 6% of EPO patents granted are opposed (Graham, 
2006). European patents are on average validated in six countries, therefore population size for the EPO is 
assumed to be the sum of the population is those six countries. In Germany the courts hearing infringement and 
validity cases are shown separately. DE* presents the data for infringement cases in Germany and DE** for 
nullity cases. Source: Cf. Table 1. 
 
In the US, the relatively large market reduces to some extent the prohibitive costs 
associated with litigation, hence the relatively high litigation rate. The oppositions are much 
cheaper at the EPO (they still cover a huge market) and are therefore much more frequent than 
the litigations in a given country. It could be argued that Figure 4 does not provide a 
comprehensive picture of how patent systems actually work. Indeed, the quality of the 
examination process and other institutional differences are not presented (ie whether the 
system allows for the opposition or for the re-examination of patents).10 The fact that the 
relationship holds good for the four European countries supports somewhat the view that 
relative litigation costs do influence the propensity to litigate. 
 
 
2.2 Institutional heterogeneity 
 
The five jurisdictions differ not only in terms of cost of proceedings but also in terms of 
institutional design and legal practices (ie procedural law, speed and quality of proceedings, 
damage assessment, type of relief or possible permanent injunction threats) as illustrated in 
Table 2. 
 
 
                                                 
10  Rotstein (2008) provides a comparison of different patent review systems: post-grant (opposition) in Europe, 
pre-grant in Austria and reexamination in the United States. 
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Table 2: Characteristics of judicial systems in four EPC states and the US, 2004 
 
 Germany France The Netherlands 
United 
Kingdom 
United 
States 
I n s t i t u t i o n a l  d e s i g n  
Judicial system Dual system Single system Single system Single system Single System 
Specialised 
court 
Federal Patent 
Court (validity); 
12 District Courts 
(infringement);  
10 Tribunal de 
Grande Instance; 
 specialised patent 
judges in Paris 
and Lyon 
specialised IP 
chamber at 
District Court 
in The Hague 
Patents County 
Courts; the 
Patents Court 
of the High 
Court 
Federal 
Courts; Court 
of Appeals for 
the Federal 
Circuit 
Q u a l i t y  o f  i n j u n c t i o n s  -  T h e  C o u r t  o f  F i r s t  I n s t a n c e  
Legally qualified 
judges 62 40 6 6 - 
Technically 
qualified judges 46 0 0 5 - 
Composition of 
the court 3 or 5 3 3 1 - 
A s s e s s m e n t  o f  d a m a g e s  
 Lost profits 
Limitation by production 
capacity and proof that 
infringing product could 
act as a substitute.  
Only if patent is used: 
calculated by amount 
of counterfeit 
products, loss of 
turnover and amount 
of lost profits. 
Same as Germany. 
Yes, likelihood of 
having made the 
infringer’s sales, 
deduction of 
infringer’s efforts 
to commercialise  
Yes, 
requirements: 
demand, 
marketing 
capacity, absence 
of competition, 
non-infringing 
substitutes. 
Licencing fee 
Most common form of 
calculation, normally 
agreed upon in court 
settlement.  
When the invention is 
not used. Infringer’s 
turnover multiplied by 
an appropriate royalty 
rate 
The minimum that 
can be claimed as 
lost profits 
Yes, a notional 
royalty as the 
minimum of lost 
profits 
Fall-back 
provision where 
lost profits cannot 
be or are not 
claimed 
Infringer’s 
profits 
Yes, deduction of 
infringer’s expenses but 
marketing efforts are 
accounted for. 
No Yes Yes, but rarely requested No 
Choice for 
plaintiff 
Yes, claim for inspection 
of infringer’s accounts 
allowed prior to choice 
of calculation base 
Yes, if patent is 
actually used 
Yes, after 
inspection of 
documents 
Yes, after review 
of the defendant’s 
commercial 
documents 
Yes 
Source: Adapted from Allgayer (2005), Council of the European Union Document No 11622/07, Heath et al. 
(2005). 
 
There are two different organisational models for judicial systems. Germany is an example 
of a country with a dual judicial system where the courts hearing infringement cases are 
separate from the court that decides on patent validity (revocation), albeit in France, the 
Netherlands, United Kingdom and in the US the same court hears and judges in both cases. 
Furthermore, some countries have specialized intellectual property chambers (France and the 
Netherlands), while others have specialized patent courts (Germany and United Kingdom). 
Countries also have different legal practice, as illustrated in Table 2. With regard to the 
quality of proceedings, Germany has the highest number of legally and technically qualified 
judges. There are apparently no technically qualified judges in France and the Netherlands.11 
Jurisdictions also differ with respect to their understanding of what ‘damages’ are and how 
to quantify them (Heath et al., 2005). There are three methods for indemnification: (i) lost 
                                                 
11   However, the judge or the parties can designate a consultant (engineer or researcher) who is actively 
involved in the proceedings but does not participate in the judges' deliberations (Council of the EU, 11622/07). 
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profits, (ii) a licensing fee and (iii) infringer’s profits12 and the way they are applied across 
jurisdictions is present in Table 2. The number of methods varies. In Germany and the 
Netherlands it is possible to assess damages on the basis of the infringer’s profits, whereas this 
method is not available in France and in the US. ‘Forum shopping’ is allowed in all the 
countries as indicated in the last row of Table 2. The plaintiff can choose the preferred method 
for assessing damages in his/her case.13 
There were attempts at the European level to address the problem of heterogeneity of 
enforcement practices. In 2004 the directive on the harmonization of the IP enforcement was 
adopted with the aim to ensure a ‘high, equivalent and homogenous level of protection’ 
throughout the EU.14 The Directive set minimum requirements regarding the enforcement 
issues but it does not address the factors that affect the outcome of the trial (ie quality of 
proceedings). In 2008 the Directive was eventually implemented by all EU member states, but 
with drastically different interpretations of the rules, therefore keeping significant disparities 
between jurisdictions.15 
The data presented in this section show high and heterogeneous relative litigation costs 
across the EPC contracting states and the US for small market value patents. The multiplicity 
of small markets (as compared to the US) actually exacerbates the prohibitive costs of 
managing and enforcing patents in Europe, especially in case of multiple parallel litigations 
within Europe. Furthermore, as countries rely on different legal procedures there is a 
possibility that the courts may issue substantially different or even opposite judgements on the 
same litigation case. But the current architecture of the European patent system induces even 
more complexity and uncertainty for assignees, as illustrated in the next section. 
 
 
3.  Managerial complexity 
 
 
The current institutional setting of the European patent system actually divides the internal 
market into geographical areas where the patent is enforced and those where it is not.16 
Further, national jurisdictions have the final ‘say’ in any enforcement issue, from patent 
validity to infringement. Such a situation entails three related economic incongruities. We call 
them ‘incongruities’ because once defined and explained they generally raise astonishment 
and disbelief towards the European construction. 
 EU-wide competition policy and national patents: The patent system is justified by the 
dynamic efficiency it is supposed to generate: the monopolistic power associated with a patent 
aims to stimulate firms to innovate. It is generally opposed to the static efficiency ensured by 
antitrust or competition policy. More competition contributes to reduce prices and hence to 
increase demand. The latter is controlled centrally in Europe, by the European Commission’s 
Directorate General Competition, for the whole European Union. There is therefore a flagrant 
                                                 
12  Damages calculated as ‘loss profits’ refer to losses incurred by the patent owner compared to the hypothetical 
situation in which he would have produced and sold the patented technology without being infringed. Licencing 
fee is calculated on the assumption that the patent holder and the infringer had entered into a licencing agreement 
before the unlawful use of protected technology took place. Infringer’s profits are the net profits of the third 
party earned through the unlawful use of the patented technology. 
13  Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007) show that the design of patent systems matters, including fees, 
inventive step, duration, subject matter etc. This chapter provides evidence that the design of post-grant 
enforcement conditions and legal practice also exhibit specific designs. Cf. Mejer and van Pottelsberghe (2008) 
for further details on institutional differences between the four European countries.  
14  Council Directive 2004/48/EC, OJ L 157, 30.4.2004. 
15  Forum shopping prospects despite Enforcement Directive, 2008, Managing Intellectual Property available at 
http://www.managingip.com/Article/1968542/Forum-shopping-prospers-despite-Enforcement-Directive.html  
16  A small fraction of patents are currently validated in the 34 countries. This occurs more frequently with 
patents filed in the pharmaceutical industry and in the biotech sector. 
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inconsistency within the European Union: its competition policy authority has a reach over the 
whole European market and the countervailing leverage provided by intellectual property 
policy is ultimately run at the national level in each of the 34 EPC contracting states. Europe 
is therefore evolving into an apparently centralised system, but where national authorities may 
invalidate a patent centrally granted by the EPO, and where a national application might 
actually be granted independently from the EPO. 
 Unfair intra-EU ‘parallel’ trade: The principle of free movement of goods in the EU 
makes it relatively easy for imitators, infringers or parallel importers to enter the European 
Union through a country where the patent has not been enforced, and then distribute it widely 
within Europe including the countries where the patent is enforced. This of course does not 
preclude enforcing the patent in the countries where it has been effectively validated, but 
makes it more difficult to identify imitated goods and counterfeited products. The company 
has to deploy financial and managerial resources to secure its markets against potential 
infringers (this function was partly performed by border controls in the past).17 Once the 
alleged infringer is identified in one of the national markets the patent holder must rely on the 
legal procedures of this particular state to enforce his rights: injunctions, seizure orders, and 
other judicial remedies which will be granted in accordance with provisions of national law.18 
The counter-argument would be that, if the probability of infringement is high, and if the 
patented invention is ‘worth it’, one would logically expect the applicant to validate and 
enforce its patent in the 34 EPC member states. This latter argument is rather fragile, however, 
as it fails to grasp the real option mechanism associated with all innovation processes. There is 
a time-lag between the moment the invention is made and its potential market success. At the 
beginning of the innovation process the entrepreneur does not have the resources, not to 
mention the time, to bear prohibitive patenting costs in numerous (small) member states. 
 Time paradox: The current institutional setting within the EU allows for time 
inconsistencies in the treatment and enforcement of patents. Within nine months of the 
decision to grant by the EPO, third parties can file an opposition against the patent (either for 
revocation or for amendments) at the EPO. The EPO decision on an opposition case is 
supposed to apply in all the countries where the patent is effectively enforced. However, the 
EPC allows third parties to challenge the validity of a patent under the legal rules of the 
countries in which the patent has been effectively validated. Such an action for nullity can be 
made directly from the date of validation in a national patent office, even if there is still an 
opposition pending at the EPO. Likewise, the patentee can sue potential infringers from the 
date of grant. The effect of the EPO opposition proceedings on parallel infringement case is 
not clear. For example, as of 2008, Belgium and France will stay the main proceeding until a 
final decision has been reached by the EPO whereas in Germany,19 Italy, the Netherlands and 
in the United Kingdom such a stay is not automatic and in most cases the courts will continue 
the proceedings notwithstanding the opposition.20 As it takes on average three years for the 
EPO to tackle an opposition case (cf. Graham 2002) it is therefore possible to be accused of 
infringement and pay damages or even endure permanent injunction at national level while the 
patent is later declared invalid by the EPO. 
 
 
                                                 
17  Kyle (2007) discusses different not-price responses to parallel trade in Europe such as rationalization of 
supply or product offerings adjustments. 
18  There is an obvious conflict between an intellectual property rights policy, whose scope is limited to national 
markets, and the principle of free movement of goods. Art. 28 Treaty of the European Union (TUE) prohibits 
quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having an equivalent effect between member states. Cf 
Keeling (2003, p. 22-30) for further discussion. 
19  However, in Germany national nullity proceedings cannot be started before the Federal Patent Court until the 
EPO opposition proceedings have been concluded or the opposition period has expired. 
20  Vandermeulen, 2008, Pan-European litigation checklist available at http://recht.nl/21867 
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Table 3: Case studies - stylised facts 
 
 EPILADY SENSEO EURO STENT 
P a t e n t  L i t i g a t i o n  k e y  d a t a  
No of EP EP 0101656 B1 EP 0904717 EP 0455750 B1 EP 0706376 B2 
Patent holder Epilady Sara Lee/DE and Philips Electronics 
Document Security 
System (DSS) Angiotech 
Date of filing (EPO) 1983 1998 1991 1994 
Date of grant (EPO) 1986 2001 2002 1997 
Alleged infringer Remington Group of Dutch and Belgian companies2 
European Central 
Bank 
Conor 
Medsystems 
Year of litigation 1989 2001 2005 2005 
D e c i s i o n s  o f  t h e  C o u r t s  
  VAL INF VAL INF VAL INF VAL INF 
CFI of the EU1 n.r - n.r - n.r declined jurisdiction n.r - 
EPO upheld n.r  revoked n.r  - n.r  upheld  n.r  
AT - NO - - pending - - - 
BE - YES upheld YES pending - - - 
DE - YES - - upheld - - - 
ES - - - - pending - - - 
IT - YES - - pending - - - 
FR - NO - - revoked - - - 
NL - YES delayed NO upheld - upheld YES 
UK  - NO - - revoked - revoked - 
I n c o n g r u i t i e s  
EU competition vs 
national patents x x x x 
Intra-EU ‘parallel’ 
trade  x x x  
Time paradox  x  x 
(1) Court of First Instance of the European Union 
(2) Retail chains: Coöperatieve Inkoopvereniging Intergro BA, Vomar and Drie Mollen in The Netherlands as 
well as Fort Koffiebranderij, Cafes Liégois and Beyers Koffie in Belgium. 
Source: Council of the EU, Working Document 11622/0; Bird and Bird, November 2004, Patent Update 
Newsletter, Benelux – Coffee Wars, pp 7-9 
http://www.twobirds.com/english/publications/newsletters/upload/19918_1.pdf (read on 1 
September 2008); and Boyes Turner, 12 June 2007, The Mystery of the Euro Bank Note: A Strange Case of 
Patent Infringement, http://www.boyesturner.com/news-article.html?id=197 (read on 1 September 
2008); CMS European Patent Review, January 2007, pp. 18-19 http://en.cms-
dsb.com/legal_news/publications/cms_european_patents_review (read on 1 September 2008); Anna 
McKay, February 2007, Angiotech, Conor - not so Obvious. Different approaches to considering the inventive 
step, www.annamckay.com/article16.html (read on 1 September 2008). 
 
 
Four case studies illustrate these economic incongruities induced by the European patent 
system and the managerial complexity this implies for firms. The case studies are briefly 
described in Table 3.  
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The property hedge: Epilady v. Remington 
 In the early 1980s Epilady invented its famous device: a ‘hair remover for use on ladies 
legs’. Once having been granted a European patent for its invention in 1986, Epilady 
successfully marketed it in eleven EPC contracting states. During the first two years of 
marketing and selling, Epilady sued 28 competitors who infringed its patented invention by 
producing one-to-one products and won in all cases. In 1988, Remington entered the 
European market with Smooth and Silky, a device that performed exactly the same function as 
Epilady but with a slightly different mechanism (the former used a rotating helical spring 
system whereas Smooth and Silky used a rotating rubber bar with slits in it) and within the 
same year it had filed an opposition at the EPO questioning the validity of Epilady’s patent.21 
In order to maintain its monopolistic position within Europe Epilady brought a patent 
infringement action against Remington in Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Meanwhile, in 1991 the EPO upheld the Epilady patent. 
Despite the harmonised laws on interpretations of the extent of protection granted through 
European patents, the subsequent rulings of the national courts on infringement differed 
across jurisdictions.22 Courts in Austria, France and the United Kingdom judged that there 
was no infringement of the Epilady patent, whereas courts in Belgium, Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands ruled that infringement took place. This case study illustrates the ‘non-European’ 
dimension of the European patent system: a clear lack of consistency Europe wide. 
 
Coffee wars: Senseo 
The Dutch-American company Sara Lee/DE and Philips Electronics developed the Senseo 
coffee machine, which makes an individual cup of coffee supplied in circular pads that are 
inserted into the machine by the user. For this technology they were granted a European patent 
worded ‘assembly for the use in a coffee machine for preparing a coffee, container and pouch 
(pad) of said assembly’. The coffee machine proved to be a great success and competitors 
started entering the market for coffee pads and delivering copy-cat products in shops. In order 
to maintain a monopolistic position in the market for pads, towards the end of 2001 Sara Lee 
initiated a number of infringement proceedings against several competitors in Belgium and in 
the Netherlands. It argued that as the pads constituted an essential part of the innovation, 
producing those pads constituted an indirect infringement of the patent. Shortly after grant, in 
September 2001, the firm Albert Heijn B.V filed an opposition before the EPO. In mid 2002 
the Court of Appeal in The Hague held in its preliminary proceedings that there was no 
indirect infringement action. Therefore, the Dutch competitors were allowed to continue 
selling their copy-cat products. Further rulings were put in abeyance pending the EPO 
decision concerning European patent validity. 
At the end of 2003 Sara Lee’s competitors seeking a declaration of non-infringement in 
Belgium filed an action before the Court of First Instance in Antwerp and won. Sara Lee 
appealed this decision and in 2004 the Antwerp Court of Appeal, without waiting for the 
outcome of the opposition at EPO, held that the competitors had infringed the patent: ‘they 
had delivered means that allowed third parties to make use of the patent which constituted an 
indirect infringement of the patent’. Sara Lee won in Belgium and kept its monopolistic 
situation until August 2006, when the EPO eventually revoked her patent in full for lack of 
inventive step. 
                                                 
21   The first opposition against the Epilady patent was filed at the EPO in 1987 by Beasille Marketing Limited. 
22   Art 69(1) of the EPC reads as follows: The extent of the protection conferred by a European patent or a 
European patent application shall be determined by the terms of the claims. Nevertheless, the description and 
drawings shall be used to interpret the claims. During the discussions at the diplomatic conference on the final 
version of the EPC this simple rule was interpreted in a completely different way by the UK and German courts. 
Instead of rewording the Article, a protocol on the interpretation of this Article was agreed upon and 
incorporated into the draft of the EPC (Straus, 2000 and Connor 2008). 
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The Senseo case shows that the current system not only allows for discrepancies in 
interpreting the claims but also induces time inconsistencies, especially when the EPO and 
national courts decide in parallel on the validity of a patent. In this case, the infringers in 
Belgium had to pay damages despite the fact that the patent was to be revoked two years later 
by the EPO. 
 
The euro: a local currency? 
An American company, Document Security System Inc. (DSS), which is specialised in 
developing, licencing and selling anti-counterfeiting technology and products, holds a 
European patent for ‘non-replicable document and method of making same’.23 This 
technology makes special images (ie stripes) on banknotes, which prevents replication when 
copying or scanning. In August 2005 DSS filed a patent infringement suit in the European 
Union’s CFI24 against the European Central Bank (ECB) claiming that the ECB was using 
their technology (ECJ case T-295/05).25 Shortly after the proceedings before the CFI started, 
the ECB filed claims to invalidate the DSS Patent in Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.  
In March 2007, two contradictory rulings on the DSS patent were issued. The United 
Kingdom Patent Court invalidated it, whereas the German Patent Court upheld it. Judgement 
on validity was delivered in January 2008 by the French court in Paris and was in line with the 
decision taken in the UK. Two months later, the Dutch court in The Hague adopted a decision 
similar to the German one and upheld the patent. In the meantime, in September 2007, the CFI 
of the European Union officially refused jurisdiction in the DDS patent infringement suit, 
paving the way for country-by-country infringement litigation related to the ‘single’ 
currency.26 Mr Patrick White, the CEO of the DSS, commenting on the decision of Dutch 
court expressed his wish to further pursue the infringement cases, at least in the Netherlands: 
 
We fully believe that the ECB will appeal this decision, but we do not expect that 
this likely appeal will impact our ability to move forward with infringement 
proceedings on our timeline. Here, our focus will be on substantial monetary 
damages for the unauthorized use of our patented technology by not only the 
ECB, but printers and third parties as well, including those who print bank notes 
in other European countries that are used in the Netherlands27 
 
Stents: Angiotech v. Conor 
The patentee, Angiotech, is a Vancouver-based pharmaceutical company that, among other 
things, invents and markets innovative technologies for complications associated with medical 
device implants. In the early 1990s, it developed and patented an innovative stent coated with 
paclitaxel-containing polymer that prevents restenosis, a typical problem following 
angioplasty.28 In 1997, Angiotech was granted a European patent EP 0706376B1 where it 
                                                 
23  Before 2001 DSS was called New Sky Communications, Inc. and was specialised in the development and 
production of theatrical motion pictures and home video cassettes. In 2002 it acquired four companies: Lester 
Levin, Inc. d/b/a Patrick Printing; Document Security Consultants, Inc. and Imperial Encryption, Inc., Thomas 
M. Wicker Enterprises, Inc., and changed its name to DSS. With those acquisitions the company came into the 
possession of intangible assets, including the European Patent EP0455750 B1. 
24  Under Art 235 of the European Community Treaty (ECT), with further reference to Art 288, a person 
claiming compensation from one of the European institutions can bring his action before the Court of First 
Instance of the European Union. 
25  In June 2005, shortly before filing the opposition, the official name of the patent-holder was changed from 
Wicker Ralph to Document Security System, Inc. 
26  Mr. Patrick White, the CEO of the DSS, made the following comment on the CFI ruling: ‘At long last, we 
have an answer as to jurisdiction (…) we now have a specific road map with the appropriate venues for further 
(infringement) actions’. Business Wire, 11 September 2007. 
27  www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS162584+12-Mar-2008+BW20080312 on 12 March 2008. 
28  Stents are mesh tubes that hold coronary arteries open and improve blood flow to the heart muscle. 
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claims paclitaxel/polymer-coated stents but gives little description of them. In the mid 1990s, 
Conor Medsystems, a Californian company specialising in the development of drug-eluting 
coronary stents, conducted similar research and patented a stent that also contained paclitaxel. 
Shortly after the grant, in spring 1998, Angiotech’s patent was opposed at the EPO by five 
different companies, including Conor. In February 2005, Angiotech initiated patent 
infringement action in the Netherlands against Conor. Shortly after, a claim was filed by 
Conor in the United Kingdom alleging that Angiotech’s stent patent was invalid. In February 
2006, the court of first instance in the UK held the Angiotech patent invalid due to the lack of 
inventive step (hence non obviousness). Its decision was further upheld by the UK Court of 
Appeal in January 2007. Subsequently, the District Court in The Hague held the opposite, 
validating Angiotech’s patent. Eventually, after nine years of opposition proceedings, in 
March 2007, the EPO decided to uphold Angiotech’s patent, however making very extensive 
amendments to the claims.29 This example shows that the definition of ‘inventive step’ is far 
from being obvious and varies across member states, which leads to different outcomes for a 
given product. 
 
The bottom rows of Table 4 show which of the ‘incongruities’ is illustrated in each case 
study. The two incongruities related to the antagonism between EU competition jurisdiction 
and national jurisdictions and to the easier intra-EU parallel trade are nearly as frequent as the 
number of patents in force in Europe. They affect the managerial complexity and litigation 
costs ‘only’ when infringement occurs. ‘Time paradox’ is a less frequent event because it 
takes place only when a centralised process (ie with litigation at the EU’s CFI or an opposition 
at the EPO) occurs simultaneously with one or several national cases of litigation. This type of 
incongruity is, however, more frequent than it appears at first sight, and the decisions of 
national courts exacerbate this effect.  
For instance, in May 2007, the UK Court of Appeal ruled that damages for patent 
infringements awarded by a UK court are not required to be paid back even if the patent is 
later declared invalid by the EPO.30 In this ruling, Lord Justice Jacob justified his decision by 
the need for certainty in business, which is quite symptomatic: 
 
First and foremost, the defendant has had a full and fair opportunity of 
attacking the validity of the patent in his own proceedings. Next there is a 
very strong public interest in the finality of litigation.[…] It is much better 
that he knows that the first litigation about validity is the time and place for 
him to get his best case together – that he knows he will have no second 
chance. 
 
What motivated Lord Justice Jacob in this case was not the simple question of which court 
was superior, but of how to best operate with an imperfect European patents system.31 
                                                                                                                                                         
Originally, stents were made of bare metal that very often caused proliferation of tissue which results in 
restenosis, arterial blockage caused by scar tissue. Nowadays, stents are often coated with products whose 
purpose is to restrain the proliferation of tissue such as paclitaxel. 
29  In January 2005, the European Patent Office Opposition Division maintained the validity of Angiotech Patent 
No. EP0706376 including claims to stents coated with a composition of paclitaxel and a polymeric carrier. 
Appeal to this decision was filled by Conor Medsystems Inc. and Sahajanand Medical Technologies Pvt. Ltd. 
The decision on the Appeal was delivered two years later in 2007. 
30  In the UK, in the case Unilin Beheer vs Berry Floor (Case No: A3/2006/1331, 1357 and 1358), the dispute 
concerned the validity and infringement of Unilin’s European patent for hardwood floor coverings. In the UK the 
patent had been held valid and infringed, while it was still in opposition at the EPO, an opposition that would 
presumably last for two more years. Even if the EPO proceedings did result in the patent being revoked, this 
would not affect Berry’s liability to pay damages, because the validity and infringement of the patent had already 
been subject to a final determination by the UK courts. 
31  Ibid. Judgement of the Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL, 25 April 2007, para 42. 
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4. Concluding remarks 
 
The fact that one judge, in the UK for instance, may actually criticise the outcome of a 
seemingly slow centralised opposition procedure (at the EPO) in favour of a localised speedy, 
but potentially unfair, decision underlines the lack of political will to create a truly European 
patent system. The EPO was created in 1978 to grant ‘European’ patents. However, once 
granted they must be enforced in each member state where protection is required, which each 
have the power to grant or invalidate patents in their own national jurisdictions and to assess 
infringements, independently from the EPO. 
This article has analysed the consequences of this highly fragmented European patent 
system, where national jurisdictions actually prevail for the enforcement of patent rights. The 
analysis mainly focuses on post-grant patenting activities in Europe, and relies on comparative 
litigation designs and occurrences, and case studies. 
Litigation costs vary significantly across jurisdictions, including within Europe. While 
absolute litigation costs are somewhat lower in continental Europe than in the US or the UK, 
relative costs are much higher in the UK and in smaller countries like the Netherlands. The 
multiplicity of small markets (as compared to the US) increases the already prohibitive costs 
of managing and enforcing patents in Europe, especially when parallel litigation occurs. 
Furthermore, as legal procedures differ across jurisdictions, there is a clear possibility of 
substantially different judgements occurring on the same subject matter. Despite the efforts to 
harmonize the enforcement of intellectual property rights (including patent rights) at the 
European level disparities will still prevail. 
But the current architecture of the European patent system generates even more complexity 
and uncertainty for patentees. The lack of a single market for innovations, where the industrial 
property rights are generally enforced in a few countries, together with the supremacy of 
national jurisdictions in patent issues, entails three related economic incongruities: an EU-
wide competition policy but national patent rights; intra-EU ‘parallel’ trade and patent 
protection; and a time paradox. Four case studies illustrate these incongruities and their 
implications for managers. There is no Europe-wide market for technology, and even the 
supposedly centralised procedure, the substantive examination performed by the EPO, is 
actually not really ‘centralised’ or ‘European’: it is possible for a national court to invalidate a 
patent granted by the EPO, or to grant a patent that has not been granted by the EPO. And 
such decisions may occur in up to 34 countries. 
These ‘incongruities’ and the prohibitive costs of enforcement or litigation in Europe 
generate both a high level of uncertainty regarding the validity of a patent (and its market 
reach) and considerable managerial complexity which clearly reduces the effectiveness and 
the attractiveness of the European patent system in terms of stimulating innovation.  
Resolving these incongruities would require the implementation of a Community patent 
together with a centralised jurisdiction mechanism. The national patent offices of the 
European Union are de facto deliberately blocking the implementation of a truly European 
patent system, thereby hindering the speed of internationalisation of their own small and 
medium-sized firms. Special tax incentives may help, but they will certainly not alleviate the 
problem of the cost, complexity and diversity of practice which generate a lack of confidence 
in the system.  
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